In Buddhist thought suffering in samsara is due to ignorance of three realities: dukkha (suffering, or better “unsatisfactoriness”), impermanence and especially non-self. There is no self, that is, as Siderits puts it, “we are empty persons, persons who are empty of selves.” To be more precise, a ‘person’ has no essence, the continued existence of which is necessary in order for that person to continue to exist. There is nothing that ‘makes me me’, that ‘gives me my identity.’
Siderits recognises that a person might say that they have come to realise their identity isn’t tied up with physical appearance, but with some other quality, for example, artistic talent or communication skills. But this does not establish that there is a self, that essence which must always exist as long as the person exists.
Of course, it is virtually impossible for Buddhists when speaking of persons to avoid using the first person pronouns ‘I’ and ‘me.’ However, they would deny that this is contradictory, arguing that in such cases such pronouns are just a useful fiction.
In arguing that there is no self Buddhism is self-referencing. It begins by defining a person in terms of five ‘aggregates’ or ‘bundles’ (skandhas), namely form, feeling, perception, volition and consciousness. It is then argued that since ‘self’ cannot be found in form, nor in feeling, nor in perception, volition or consciousness that there can be no self. Consequently, this argument only works if this analysis of what makes a person is exhaustive, comprehensive.
From a Christian standpoint this whole enterprise is flawed. To begin with, it inevitably involves mind-body dualism. The moment it is decided that ‘self’ is not to be found in the body then, so the argument goes, we must look for an “I” that is not identifiable with the body. Again, this philosophical approach is wrong-headed because it presupposes from the very start that any concept of self can only be determined by viewing the person as a self-contained entity. There are two problems with this. Firstly, Buddhism is so committed to the concept of contingent arising, that is, interdependence to the nth degree, that there is no such thing as a self-contained entity. Hence the conclusion is already implicit in the presuppositions that shape the very mode of analysis and consideration of this issue.
Secondly, this assumption assumes the non-existence of God and therefore discounts at the very beginning any possibility that the self is not an autonomous part but actually something that exists by virtue of its relationship to its Creator.
The Bible teaches that people are created in the image of God and this is an wholistic concept. The whole person, body and spirit, is created with the intent that it image God, reflect and radiate his glory. I am a self precisely because I am a created being who is personally held accountable by God for the way in which I as an individual live my life and whether I fulfil the purpose for which I have been created or not. Indeed, there will never be a time when God is not concerned that “I” be such a person. Hence I do have an eternal self.
Having said this, I do want to recognise that we have something to learn from Buddhism when it comes to identifying the true self. That is, vast numbers of people in our world do not find their true identity in being creatures created to honour and thank their Creator (Romans 1:21). Instead, they seek to find their identity in qualities and characteristics that are not at the heart of what it means to be a true self. Given this I do find the following story, as related by Siderits very penetrating in its insights. Although it falls short of a biblical view of self it does succeed in showing the conventional nature of many people’s understanding of themselves. It does underscore the reality that indeed those outside of Christ are “empty persons”:
Then King Milinda drew near to where the venerable Nagasena was; and having drawn near, he greeted the venerable Nagasena; and having passed the compliments of friendship and civility, he sat down respectfully at one side. And the venerable Nagasena returned the greeting; by which, verily, he won the heart of King Milinda.
And King Milinda spoke to the venerable Nagasena as follows: “How is your reverence called? Sir, what is your name?”
“Your majesty, I am called Nagasena; my fellow-monks, your majesty, address me as Nagasena: but whether parents give one the name Nagasena, or Surasena, or Virasena, or Sihasena, it is, nevertheless, your majesty, just a counter, an expression, a convenient designator, a mere name, this Nagasena; for there is no person here to be found.
King Milinda then addresses the assembled company:
Nagasena here says thus: “There is no person here to be found.” Is it possible, pray, for me to assent to what he says?”
And King Milinda spoke to the venerable Nagasena as follows: “Nagasena, if there is no person to be found, who is then that furnishes you monks with the priestly requisites – robes, flood, bedding, and medicine, the needs of the sick? who is it that makes use of the same? who is it that keeps the precepts? who is that applies himself to meditation? who is it that realizes the Paths, the Fruits, and nirvana? who is it that destroys life? who is it that takes what is not given him? who is it that commits immorality? who is it that tells lies? who is it that drinks intoxicating liquor? who is it that commits the five crimes that constitute ‘proximate karma’? In that case, there is no merit; there is no demerit; there is no one who does or has done meritorious or de meritorious deeds; neither good nor evil deeds can have any fruit or result. Nagasena, neither is he a murderer who kills a monk, nor can you monks, Nagasena, have any teacher, preceptor, or ordination.”
Milinda proceeds by seeking to expose still further what he sees as the absurdity of Nagasena’s claim:
When you say, ‘My fellow-monks, your majesty, address me as Nagasena,’ what then is this Nagasena? Pray, sir, is the hair of the head Nagasena?’
‘Indeed not, your majesty.’
‘Is the hair of the body Nagasena?’
‘Indeed not, your majesty.’
‘Are nails teeth skin flesh sinews bones marrow of the bones … kidneys heart liver pleura spleen lungs intestines mesentery stomach faeces bile phlegm … pus blood sweat fat … tears lymph saliva snot synovial fluid urine brain of the head Nagasena?’
‘Indeed not, your majesty.’
‘Is now, sir, rupa Nagasena?’
‘Indeed not, your majesty.’
‘Is feeling Nagasena?’
‘Indeed not, your majesty.
”Is perception Nagasena?’
‘Indeed not, your majesty.’
‘Is volition Nagasena?’
‘Indeed not, your majesty.’
‘Is consciousness Nagasena?’
‘Indeed not, your majesty.’
‘Are, then, sir, rupa, feeling, perception, the volition, and consciousness unitedly Nagasena?’
‘Indeed not, your majesty.’‘Is it, then, sir, something besides rupa, feeling, perception, volition, and consciousness, which is Nagasena?’
‘Indeed not, your majesty.
‘Sir, although I question you very closely, I fail to discover any Nagasena. Verily, now, sir, Nagasena is a mere empty sound. What Nagasena is there here? Sir you speak a falsehood, a lie: there is no Nagasena.’
However, Nagasena argues back that there is indeed a definite distinction to be made between “Nagasena” as “a mere empty sound” and “Nagasena” as “a convenient designator”:
Then the venerable Nagasena spoke to King Milinda as follows: ‘Your majesty, you are a delicate prince, an exceedingly delicate prince; and if, your majesty, you walk in the middle of the day on hot sandy ground, and you tread on rough grit, gravel, and sand, your feet become sore, your body tired, the mind is oppressed, and the body-consciousness suffers. Pray, did you come on foot, or riding?’
‘Sir, I do not go on foot. I came in a chariot.’
‘Your majesty, if you came in a chariot, tell me what the chariot is. Pray, your majesty, is the pole the chariot?’
‘Indeed not, sir. ‘
‘Is the axle the chariot?’
‘Indeed not, sir. ‘
‘Are the wheels the chariot?’
‘Indeed not, sir.’
‘Is the chariot-body the chariot?’
‘Indeed not, sir.’
‘Is the banner-staff the chariot?’
‘Indeed not, sir.’
‘Is the yoke the chariot?’
‘Indeed not, sir.’
‘Are the reins the chariot ?’
‘Indeed not, sir.’
‘Is the goading-stick the chariot?’
‘Indeed not, sir. ‘
‘Pray, your majesty, are pole, axle, wheels, chariot-body, banner-staff, yoke, reins, and goad unitedly the chariot?’
‘Indeed not, sir.’
‘Is it, then, your majesty, something else besides pole, axle, wheels, chariot-body, bannerstaff, yoke, reins, and goad which is the chariot?’
‘Indeed not, sir. ‘
‘Your majesty, although I question you very closely, I fail to discover any chariot. Verily now, your majesty, the word chariot is a mere empty sound. What chariot is there here? Your majesty, you speak a falsehood, a lie: there is no chariot. Your majesty, you are the chief king in all the continent of India; of whom are you afraid that you speak a lie? Listen to me, my lords, you five hundred Yonakas, and you eighty thousand monks! King Milinda here says thus: “I came in a chariot;’” and being requested, “Your majesty, if you came in a chariot, tell me what the chariot is,” he fails to produce any chariot. Is it possible, pray, for me to assent to what he says ?’
Milinda is persuaded by Nagasena’s argument:
When he had thus spoken, the five hundred Yonakas applauded the venerable Nagasena and spoke to King Milinda as follows: ‘Now, your majesty, answer, if you can.’
Then King Milinda spoke to the venerable Nagasena as follows: ‘Nagasena, I speak no lie: the word “chariot” functions as just a counter, an expression, a convenient designator, a mere name for pole, axle, wheels, chariot-body, and banner-staff. ‘
‘Thoroughly well, your majesty, do you understand a chariot. In exactly the same way, your majesty, in respect of me, “Nagasena” functions as just a counter, an expression, convenient designation, mere name for the hair of my head, hair of my body … brain of the head, rupa, feeling, perception, the volition, and consciousness. But ultimately there is no person to be found. And the nun Vajira, your majesty, said this before the Blessed One: “Just as there is the word “chariot” for a set of parts,’ So when there are skandhas it is the convention to say, ‘There is a living being.’”
‘It is wonderful, Nagasena! It is marvelous, Nagasena! Brilliant and prompt is the wit of your replies.’
It is significant here, of course, that it is denied that the chariot can be viewed as all the parts together and this is essential to the denial that when all the five bundles that define a person are viewed collectively they still don’t constitute an essential self. The point is that “chariot” functions much like “Nagasena” – it is but a convenient designator. Arguably, though, it is specious to compare an inanimate object, a ‘chariot’, with a person, ‘Nagasena.’ At one level Buddhist thought is predicated on the incorrect assumption that persons are not significantly different from any other experienced phenomena.
Notwithstanding such deficiencies there is sufficient traction in this Buddhist demolition of the self to highlight how empty are the lives of all outside of Christ. There is indeed no solid, eternal and valued identity to be found outside of a relationship with the Lord Jesus.
[Reference: Mark Siderits, Buddhism as Philosophy: An Introduction (Great Britain: Ashgate / Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 2007) 50-54]
Posted August 5, 2011
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November 28th, 2011 at 3:50 pm
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