Lately, much of what I’ve been reading bears on what it means to be human. Angus Taylor, philosopher and author of Animals and Ethics, argues that consistency requires excluding some humans from the moral community and including at least some animals in it.
A ghoulish story serves as the launching pad for his argument. A Transylvanian Count was devoted to famine-relief projects as a goodwill ambassador for the UN and had also established a large orphanage not far from his residence, near a large, partially-forested park. Many of the orphans were mentally handicapped and were not wanted for adoption. The Count ensured that the orphans all received the necessities of life, lots of social interaction, excellent medical care and recreational outlets. Given their mental incapacity the orphans were not able to imagine their long-term futures but lived almost purely in the present. The Count visited the orphanage frequently, knew each child by name and treated them with great affection.
The Count was morally opposed to buying factory-farmed meat because he saw this as involving great suffering on the creatures farmed and ecologically damaging. So instead of buying pork or beef at the supermarket he would hunt in the park and kill and eat an orphan, always choosing one that was one of the most severely brain-damaged. He argued that since his resources were not unlimited he had to find room for new arrivals to the orphanage. He further reasoned that there wasn’t much difference in the nature of life for either the animals people consumed and the orphans.
Taylor anticipates the sense of revulsion readers will feel but proposes anyway what some ethicists dub an “argument from marginal cases”:
Whatever criterion we require for a being’s membership in ‘the moral community’ - whatever measure we use to distinguish those worthy of being treated with respect from those we may justly exploit - whether that criterion be reason, moral agency, the ability to communicate or engage in social relations, or simply the capacity to experience pain and pleasure, it seems that either not all human beings will qualify, or some non-human animals will.
Taylor recognises that the view that some human lives are worth less than others is unpalatable - a deliberate pun - to most of us. But then Taylor reasons that if human beings have a special value simply because they are human “there must be something about being human that gives them such unique worth”, since otherwise we end up with something as illogical as “Men are worth more than women simply because they are men.” Taylor considers the common view that moral agency gives humans unique worth and “the argument from species normality” that since this “is a typical and distinguishing characteristic of human beings” even those humans who are not able to reason about right and wrong, make reasonable choices and be held accountable for their actions still have moral worth.
Taylor questions the logic of distributing intrinsic value based on moral agency from the generic human species to its members, arguing that collectivities such as species are not conscious beings and, therefore, lack moral agency. Consequently, Taylor seeks for an intrinsic value that belongs to the individual, maintaining:
A human lacking moral agency cannot derive intrinsic moral value simply from membership in the human species.
Taylor appeals to “acquired duties” as the basis for giving severely mentally deficient humans special treatment. He reasons that
by bringing children into my life, I have acquired certain responsibilities to them that I do not have to most other people.
He then suggests:
Perhaps we each have “acquired duties” towards other humans just by living in community with them.
I would want to underline and boldface that word “Perhaps” not having any confidence that this is at all a necessary or likely conclusion.
Taylor also considers the attempt to separate all humans from all other known animals involved in the contract view of morality, as argued by Thomas Hobbes in the 17th century. This philosophy considers morality to be “an agreement entered into by rational individuals in order to advance their own interests”. But animals don’t count, morally speaking, because they have a limited or non-existent ability to understand and abide by contracts and humans have no incentive to enter into contracts with animals. However, as Taylor observes, this “contractarianism” does not ascribe any intrinsic worth to humans.
Blurring the boundaries between humans and animals, Taylor reasons:
if we refuse to ascribe to perceptive, aware animals the right to be treated with respect, then we undermine the right of all humans to be treated with respect. Logical consistency therefore appears to require a reassessment of who qualifies for membership in the moral community.
The bottom line is that Taylor is not able to find any basis for recognising any intrinsic worth in being human. As I have said in previous blogs and will no doubt say many times again, the moment we try to understand what it means to be human from a merely anthropological standpoint we are doomed to adopt a position that to a greater or lesser extent will dehumanise people. In Taylor’s Godless universe his only approach to understanding what it means to be human is by comparison and contrast with animals. However, once we understand that people are created beings and that God himself has discriminated between humans and animals by uniquely creating humans in his image to bear his likeness, then and only then, do we have a sure basis for recognising the intrinsic worth of each and every human individual on the place of the planet. It is with this in mind that James says:
With the tongue we praise our Lord and Father, and with it we curse men, who have been made in God’s likeness (James 3:9).
Each and every person is to be treated with immense reverence because he and she, no matter whether they are competent moral agents or not, were created in God’s likeness.
Reference: Angus Taylor, “Hunting for Consistency” in Philosophy Now 67 (May/June 2008) 8-10
Posted June 25, 2008
Upon clicking 'Buy now' you will be redirected to paypal.com where you can securely and quickly complete your purchase with a few clicks.
Immediately after payment at PayPal you will be redirected to a download page which
provides you instant access to your purchase.
