In God, Freedom and Evil Alvin Plantinga distinguishes between various kinds of contradictions and argues that it is not possible to construct a logical set that demonstrates there is a contradiction between the reality of evil, on the one hand, and God’s goodness, omnipotence, omniscience, on the other.
The typical function of natural theology, involving philosophical proofs for the existence of God, is not to convince people of God’s existence but to demonstrate that religious belief is rationally acceptable (2). By contrast, natural atheology presents arguments for the falsehood of theistic beliefs (2-3).
Many believe the existence of evil makes belief in God unreasonable or rationally unacceptable. Hume asks: if God is perfectly benevolent and also omnipotent, or almighty, why is there any evil in the world? Why does he permit it? (10)
One answer is by supplying a theodicy explaining God’s reason(s) for permitting evil or creating a world that contained evil (10).
But theodicy is not necessary for the rebuttal of Hume’s argument. For if God does have a good reason for permitting evil it does not follow that the theist would know that that reason is (10). God may have a perfectly good reason for not revealing this.
Consequently, the atheological argument from the problem of evil, to succeed, must “show that it is impossible or anyhow unlikely that God should have a reason for permitting evil” (11).
The atheological argument succeeds if it can show there is a contradiction in asserting God is perfectly good, omnipotent and omniscient and, at the same time, in asserting there is evil. It is arguable, following Plantinga, that there is in fact no atheological argument capable of doing this.
More on this in future posts.
Posted July 6, 2008
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