In Philosophy Now (Sept/Oct 2009) Raymond Tallis argues against the idea that mind and brain are the same thing. Here he distinguishes between necessary and sufficient conditions. To use his example: it is a necessary condition of Tallis being knocked down by a 97 bus in London that he must be in London. But this is not a sufficient condition. For instance, the 97 bus must be in the same street; Tallis must walk iin front of the bus; the driver fails to stop in time, etc.
As this example indicates, a necessary condition or set of conditions of something happening is “that without which it will not happen.” A sufficient condition or set of conditions is “that which is enough to ensure something happens.”
Although there are philosophical difficulties in understanding necessary and sufficient conditions the essential point is that there is a gap between them. With respect to the question of the relationship between the mind and the brain here is what can be said about this gap. Firstly, a brain in some working order is a necessary condition for human consciousness. A functioning brain is a necessary condition for every aspect of consciousness, but it is not a sufficient condition.
Secondly, the brain requires a body, not merely to survive but to have something to work with.
Thirdly, an embodied brain requires a physical environment.
Consciousness cannot be regarded as identical with neural activity in the central cortex, the brain stem, the thalamus, whatever. Sensations, affections and reasons are not to be found in bits of the brain, nor are they distributed throughout the brain.
Humans are not merely organisms. They are persons operating in a public space - a community of minds, presupposing a shared history reaching into the very distant past. So it is futile to look for consciousness in the activitity of the individual brain and to look for phenomena of everyday consciousness such as love, reasoning and appreciation of jokes in parts of the brain.
Tallis led an epilepsy clinic for many years. He points out that epilepsy involves movements that are meaningless twitches showing that mere neural activity in the stand-alone brain is not a sufficient condition for ordinary human behaviour, especially when we further discriminate between the epileptic fit and the person who experiences it - a person who decides to go to see the doctor, who organises a friend to babysit while he/she does this, who is willing or otherwise to trust the doctor and act upon medical advice, embarking on a lifetime course of medicine.
Our ordinary memories and our ordinary current experiences make sense because they are part of a world which does not possess merely physical properties but is a network of significance upheld by the community of minds of which we are individually a part.
Hallucinations induced in the stand-alone brain by electrical stimulation or some forms of epilepsy seem to make brain electricity a sufficient cause of experience, but only because they parasitize a real world already experienced in the usual way.
Tallis recalls shuddering when he heard people identify people with epilepsy as “epileptics”, that is, identifying the patient with the brain condition. Collapsing the distance between the brain condition and the person who copes with it not only dehumanises people but is also metaphysically wrong.
www.facetofaceintercultural.com.au
Posted November 24, 2009
Upon clicking 'Buy now' you will be redirected to paypal.com where you can securely and quickly complete your purchase with a few clicks.
Immediately after payment at PayPal you will be redirected to a download page which
provides you instant access to your purchase.
