Bernard Lewis, the Cleveland E. Dodge Professor Emeritus of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University, is a world authority on Islamic history. This summary continues a series, which aims at understanding Lewis’ thought with respect to Islam.
Following the common consensus, Lewis dates the modern history of the Middle East from 1798. It was then that General Napoleon Bonaparte easily conquered Egypt and temporarily ruled it. Bonaparte told the Egyptians he represented a French Republic based on liberty and equality.
Equality is integral to Islamic belief, though this does not apply to three “inferior” categories of humanity: slaves, unbelievers and women. Islam never developed anything corresponding to the caste system of India or privileged European aristocracies.
But in Arabic “liberty” was not a political but a legal term, not referring to good government. After an Egyptian sheikh al-Tahtawi, spent time in Paris, he equated the French concept of freedom with the Muslim concept of justice.
Is Western-Style Freedom Transferable?
There are two main views on this in the US and Europe:
- Islamic peoples are incapable of civilized government and doomed to be ever ruled by tyrants. Departments of state and foreign offices typically believe the aim of foreign policy should be to make sure they are our well-disposed towards them rather than hostile. Since this expresses ignorance of the Arab past, contempt for the Arab present and unconcern for the Arab future, it is ironic that this is called the “pro-Arab” view.
- Since Arab ways are different from ours they must be allowed to develop their own culturally compatible version of democracy – the often condemned “imperialist” view.
Lewis contends that it is not true that Arab and Islamic society has always been like it is today. Indeed, according to Lewis, the dictatorships of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and of Mubarak in Egypt have absolutely no roots in the Arab or Islamic past. So in 1786 the French ambassador in Istanbul contrasted the French king’s absolute sovereignty expressed in quick decision-making, with the Ottoman sultan’s need to consult with various leaders involving a slow decision-making process. But modern Middle Eastern government is no longer like this.
Modernization and Nazi and Soviet Influence
As Middle Eastern rulers became painfully aware that their societies were undeveloped compared with the advanced Western world, it was they, not imperialists who sought to modernize their societies. The consequences were often disastrous:
- They increased the power of the state and the ruler enormously.
- They limited or destroyed traditional forces that previously had limited the autocracy of the ruler. Lewis explains: “…there were established orders-the bazaar merchants, the scribes, the guilds, the country gentry, the military establishment, the religious establishment, and so on. These were powerful groups in society, whose heads were not appointed by the ruler but arose from within the groups. And no sultan, however powerful, could do much without maintaining some relationship with these different orders in society. This is not democracy as we currently use that word, but it is certainly limited, responsible government. And the system worked. Modernization ended that.”
Lewis identifies two stages in the destruction of the old order, neither of which had anything to do with the traditional or Islamic past:
- “A new ruling class emerged, ruling from the center and using the apparatus of the state for its purposes.”
- After 1940, when the overwhelming majority of colonial French governors sided with Vichy (where the collaborationist government was formed) rather than de Gaulle, the French mandated territory of Syria-Lebanon lay open to the Nazi propaganda and even the temporary setting up of a pro-Nazi, fascist regime in Iraq. During this period political parties were formed that were the nucleus of the later Baath Party, which adapted to communism well, when the Soviets established an extremely powerful presence in Egypt, Syria and Iraq after World War II.
Wahhabism and Oil
Lewis speaks of a series of movements that can be described as an Islamic revival or reawakening and highlights the immense influence of Wahhabi Islam, founded by Ibn Abd al-Wahhab:
- Arab-Islamic troubles arise from following the ways of the infidel and abandoning pure, original Islam, though one, Lewis argues, that has little connect to the original form of Islam.
- In the mid-1920s the Wahhabi tribal chiefs of the House of Saud conquered Mecca and Medina, giving them huge prestige and influence in the entire Islamic world, plus control of the pilgrimage, thereby influencing millions of Muslims who flock to the same place at the same time every year.
- The discovery of oil in the mid-1920s gave this extremist sect immense wealth, making what otherwise would have been a lunatic fringe a major force in the world of Islam. Muslims living in Western cities who want their children to be grounded in Islamic faith and culture send them to evening classes, weekend schools, holiday camps, etc., which are overwhelmingly funded and therefore controlled by the Wahhabis – a major force in Muslim immigrant communities. So, for example, while in Turkey Muslims are taught a relatively modern, moderate Islam, in Germany Turkish Muslims are largely educated in Wahhabism.
The Iranian Revolution and Al-Qaeda
While the word “revolution” is usually misused in the Middle East, being used for virtually every change of government, the Iranian Revolution was as much a real revolution as the French and Russian revolutions, bringing a massive shift of power – socially, economically and ideologically – while also having a tremendous impact in the world of Islam. At the time Lewis was lecturing in religious universities in Indonesia and witnessed the way Indonesian Muslims venerated Khomeini, despite the fact that he was a Shiite and they otherwise had little interest in what was happening in the Middle East.
Lewis next considers the most recent phase of the Islamic revival, that associated with Al-Qaeda, the organization headed by Osama bin Laden. While Westerners tend to think of the defeat of Russia in Afghanistan as a Western or more particularly American victory in the Cold War, it is viewed otherwise in the Islamic world – as a Muslim victory in a jihad – a very plausible interpretation. Osama bin Laden traces over the centuries a struggle between Christianity and Islam, culminating in a “final phase of the ongoing struggle” in which he saw “the world of the infidels… divided between two superpowers – the United States and the Soviet Union.” Bin Laden declared, “Now we have defeated and destroyed the more difficult and the more dangerous of the two. Dealing with the pampered and effeminate Americans will be easy.” He points to Vietnam, Beirut and Somalia as evidence that when the Americans are hit, they run. While America’s meek response to repeated attacks in the 1990s seemed to justify bin Laden’s comments, the American response to 9/11 was a nasty surprise. However, what Westerners see as free debate is seen by bin Laden and his followers as evidence of weakness, fear and division which justifies their belief in America’s weakness and inspires them to prepare for the final victory and the final jihad.
Conclusion
Lewis considers what Westerners mean by freedom and democracy. Recalling that after the War of Independence American democracy was compatible with slavery and the disenfranchisement of women, Lewis argues there are necessarily different versions of “democracy.” Lewis believes there are elements in Islamic society that may well be conducive to democracy, citing expressions of this in Iraq and urging his readers not to be misled by the media. Lewis also finds pro-American feeling to be strongest in those countries that have anti-American governments, and anti-American feeling strongest in those countries ruled by so-called “friendly governments”.
Although Lewis finds some hopeful signs that free institutions might develop in Muslim countries, he recognizes that counter-forces are very powerful and well entrenched. He concludes:
And one of the greatest dangers is that on their side, they are firm and convinced and resolute. Whereas on our side, we are weak and undecided and irresolute. And in such a combat, it is not difficult to see which side will prevail. I think that the effort is difficult and the outcome uncertain, but I think the effort must be made. Either we bring them freedom, or they destroy us.
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